Modeling Theory of Mind in Multi-Agent Games Using Adaptive Feedback
  Control by Freire, Ismael T. et al.
Modeling Theory of Mind in Multi-Agent Games Using
Adaptive Feedback Control
Ismael T. Freirea,c,∗, Xerxes D. Arsiwallaa,b,c, Jordi-Ysard Puigbo`a,c, Paul
Verschure a,b,c,d,∗
aInstitute for Bioengineering of Catalonia (IBEC), Barcelona, Spain
bUniversitat Pompeu Fabra (UPF), Barcelona, Spain
cBarcelona Institute of Science and Technology (BIST), Barcelona, Spain
dCatalan Institution for Research and Advanced Studies (ICREA), Barcelona, Spain
Abstract
A major challenge in cognitive science and AI has been to understand how
autonomous agents might acquire and predict behavioral and mental states of
other agents in the course of complex social interactions. How does such an agent
model the goals, beliefs, and actions of other agents it interacts with? What are
the computational principles to model a Theory of Mind (ToM)? Deep learning
approaches to address these questions fall short of a better understanding of
the problem. In part, this is due to the black-box nature of deep networks,
wherein computational mechanisms of ToM are not readily revealed. Here, we
consider alternative hypotheses seeking to model how the brain might realize a
ToM. In particular, we propose embodied and situated agent models based on
distributed adaptive control theory to predict actions of other agents in five dif-
ferent game theoretic tasks (Harmony Game, Hawk-Dove, Stag-Hunt, Prisoners
Dilemma and Battle of the Exes). Our multi-layer control models implement
top-down predictions from adaptive to reactive layers of control and bottom-
up error feedback from reactive to adaptive layers. We test cooperative and
competitive strategies among seven different agent models (cooperative, greedy,
tit-for-tat, reinforcement-based, rational, predictive and other’s-model agents).
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We show that, compared to pure reinforcement-based strategies, probabilistic
learning agents modeled on rational, predictive and other’s-model phenotypes
perform better in game-theoretic metrics across tasks. Our autonomous multi-
agent models capture systems-level processes underlying a ToM and highlight
architectural principles of ToM from a control-theoretic perspective.
Keywords: Multi-Agent Systems, Cognitive Architectures, Theory of Mind,
Game Theory, Reinforcement Learning
1. Introduction
How do autonomous social agents model goals, beliefs and actions of other
agents they interact with in complex social environments? This has long been a
central question in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. It forms the basis
of what is known as Theory of Mind (ToM), a long-standing problem in cognitive
science concerned with how cognitive agents form predictions of mental and
behavioral states of other agents in the course of social interactions [1, 2]. The
precise mechanisms by which the brain achieves this capability is not entirely
understood. Furthermore, how a ToM can be embodied in artificial agents
is very relevant for the future course of artificial intelligence (AI), especially
with respect to human-machine interactions. What can be said concerning
architectural and computational principles necessary for a Theory of Mind? As
a small step in that direction, we propose and validate control-based cognitive
architectures to predict actions and models of other agents in five different game
theoretic tasks.
It is known that humans also use their ToM to attribute mental states,
beliefs, and intentions to inanimate objects [3], suggesting that the same mech-
anisms governing ToM may be integral to other aspects of human cognition. We
argue that in order to understand both, how ToM is implemented in biological
brains and how it may be modeled in artificial agents, one must first identify
its architectural principles and constraints from biology.
Several notable approaches addressing various aspects of this problem al-
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ready exist, particularly, those based on artificial neural networks [4, 5]. Recent
work in [6] on Machine Theory of Mind is one such example. This work pro-
poses that some degree of theory of mind can be autonomously obtained from
pure Reinforcement Learning (RL). However, the use of Black-Box Optimiza-
tion algorithms, hinders the understanding one can obtain at the mechanistic
level. Because BBO algorithms are able to approximate any complex function
(as suggested for Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM)-based neural networks [7]),
one cannot use that to decipher specific mechanisms that may underlie a ToM
in these systems.
Another interesting approach to ToM follows the work of [8, 9, 10, 11] which
uses hierarchical Bayesian inference. These methods are cognitively-inspired
and suggest the existence of a ”psychology engine” in cognitive agents to pro-
cess ToM computations. Nevertheless, the challenge for this approach remains
explaining how the computational cost of running these models might be im-
plemented in biological substrates of embodied and situated agents.
A third approach to this problem follows from work on autonomous multi-
agent models (see [12] for a recent survey). This approach has had its roots in
statistical machine learning theory and robotics. It includes agent models ca-
pable of policy reconstruction, type-classification, planning, recursive reasoning
and group modeling. In a sense, this is closest to the approach we take in this
work, even though, our models are grounded in cognitive control systems. Open
challenges in the field of autonomous multi-agent systems include modeling fully
embodied agents that operate with only partial observability of their environ-
ment and are flexibly able to learn across tasks (including meta-learning), when
interacting with multiple types of other agents.
The cognitive agent models we propose here, advance earlier work on Control-
based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) [13], where we studied the formation of
social conventions in the Battle of the Exes game. The CRL model implements
a feedback control loop handling the agent’s reactive behaviors (pre-wired re-
flexes), along with an adaptive layer that uses reinforcement learning to maxi-
mize long-term reward. We showed that this model was able to simulate human
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data in the above-mentioned coordination game.
The new contribution of the current paper is to advance real-time learning
and control strategies to model agents with specific phenotypes, that can learn to
either model or predict the opposing agents actions. Using top-down predictions
from the adaptive to reactive control layers and bottom-up error feedback from
reactive to adaptive layers, we test cooperative and competitive strategies for
seven different multi-agent behavioral models. The purpose of this study is
to understand how the architectural assumptions behind each of these models
impact agent performance across standard game-theoretic tasks, and what this
implies for the development of an artificial embodied ToM.
2. Methods
2.1. Game Theoretic Tasks
Benchmarks inspired by game theory are becoming standard in the multi-
agent reinforcement learning literature [4, 5, 6, 14]. However, most of the work
developed in this direction presents models that are tested in one single task or
environment [15, 16, 17, 13, 18, 19], at best two [20, 21]. This raises a funda-
mental question about how these models generalize to deal with a more general
or diverse set of problems. Therefore, this approach does not readily enable
one to extract principles and mechanisms or unravel the dynamics underlying
human cooperation and social decision-making.
In this work, we want to go a step further and propose a five-task benchmark
for predictive models based on classic normal-form games extracted from Game
Theory: the Prisoner’s dilemma, the Harmony game, the Hawk-dove, the Stag-
hunt and the Battle of the Exes.
In its normal-form, games are depicted in a matrix that contains all the pos-
sible combinations of actions that players can choose, along with its respective
rewards. The most common among them are the dyadic games known as social
dilemmas, in which players have to choose between two actions: cooperate or
defect. One action (cooperate) is more generous and renders a good amount of
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reward to each player if both choose it, but gives very poor results if the other
player decides to defect. On the other hand, the second action (defect) provides
a significant individual reward if its taken alone, but a very small one if both
choose it.
Although simple in nature, these dyadic games are able to model key ele-
ments of social interaction, such as the tension between the benefit of a coop-
erative action and the risk (or temptation) of free-riding. This feature can be
described in a general form, such as:
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate R, R S, T
Defect T, S P, P
Table 1: A Social Dilemma in matrix-form
This matrix represents the outcomes of all possible combination of actions
between the row player and the column player. R stands for ”reward for mutual
cooperation”; T for ”temptation of defecting”; S for the ”sucker’s payoff for non-
reciprocated cooperation”; and P for ”punishment for mutual defection”. By
manipulating the relationship between the values of this matrix, many different
situations can be obtained that vary in terms of what would be an optimal
solution (or Nash equilibria [22]).
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (table 2) represents the grim situation in which
the temptation of defecting (T) is more rewarding that mutual cooperation
(R), and the punishment for mutual defection (P) is still more beneficial than a
failed attempt of cooperation (S). This relationship among the possible outcomes
can be stated as T > R > P > S. Mutual defection is the only pure Nash
equilibrium in this game since there is no possibility for any player to be better
off by individually changing its own strategy.
On the Stag-Hunt (table 3) we face a context in which mutual cooperation
(R) gives better results and individual defection (T), but at the same time a
failed cooperation (S) is worse than the punishment for mutual defection (P). In
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this case, R > T > P > S, there are two Nash equilibria: mutual cooperation
and mutual defection.
Hawk-dove (table 4) presents a scenario in which temptation (T) is more
rewarding than cooperation (R), but a mutual defection (P) is less desirable than
non-reciprocated cooperation (S). So, for a relationship of T > R > S > P like
this one, there are three Nash equilibria: two pure anti-coordination equilibrium,
in which each player chooses always the opposite action of its opponent, and
one mixed equilibrium, in which each player probabilistically chooses between
the two pure strategies.
The fourth type of social dilemma is the Harmony game (table 5). In this case
(R > T > S > P ), the game has only one pure equilibrium, pure cooperation,
since mutual cooperation (R) renders a better outcomes that the temptation
to defect (T), and also the penalty for failing to cooperate (S) is less than the
punishment for mutual defection (P).
Finally, as the last game, we will introduce a coordination game, the Battle
of the Exes [23, 24]. In this type of game, the main goal is to achieve coordi-
nation between two players (either congruent coordination on the same action
or incongruent coordination upon choosing different actions), since the failure
to do so is heavily penalized (see table 6). Following the previous nomenclature
applied in the social dilemmas, we could define this game as T > S; R,P = 0.
This game has two pure-dominance equilibria, in which one player chooses the
more rewarding action and the other the low rewarding action; and a turn-
taking equilibrium, in which players alternate over time in choosing the more
rewarding action.
This selection of games provides enough variability to test how learning
agents can perform across different contexts, so we avoid problems derived from
over-fitting on a specific payoff distribution, or related to the possibility of a
model to exploit/capitalize on certain features of a game that could not have
been predicted beforehand. Moreover, a similar selection of games have been
tested in human experiments, proving to be sufficient to classify a reduced set of
behavioral phenotypes across games in human players [25, 26]. Using the above
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Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2, 2 0, 3
Defect 3, 0 1, 1
Table 2: prisoner’s dilemma
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3, 3 0, 2
Defect 2, 0 1, 1
Table 3: stag-hunt
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 2, 2 1, 3
Defect 3, 1 0, 0
Table 4: hawk-dove
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate 3, 3 1, 2
Defect 2, 1 0, 0
Table 5: harmony game
A B
A 0, 0 1, 4
B 4, 1 0, 0
Table 6: battle of the exes
games as benchmarks, below we describe the control-theoretic framework and
seven agent models that capture phenotypes relevant for testing ToM capabili-
ties across games.
2.2. Control-Based Reinforcement Learning
Our starting point is the Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) model
presented in previous work [13]. The CRL is a biologically grounded cognitive
model composed of two control layers (Reactive and Adaptive, see Figure 1),
and based on the principles of the Distributed Adaptive Control (DAC) theory
[27]. The Reactive Layer represents the agent’s pre-wired reflexes and serves for
real-time control of sensorimotor contingencies. The Adaptive Layer endows the
agent with learning abilities that maximize long-term reward by choosing which
action to perform in each round of the game. This layered structure allows for
top-down and bottom-up interactions between the two layers [28], resulting in
an optimal control at different time-scales: within each round of play and across
7
rounds [13].
Figure 1: A) Representation of the Control-based Reinforcement Learning (CRL) model. The
top red box depicts the Adaptive Layer or the original CRL model, composed of an Actor-
Critic Temporal-Difference (TD) learning algorithm. The bottom green box represents the
Reactive layer, with its three sets of sensors, one for the ’cooperate’ location (sC), one for the
’defect’ location (sD), and one for the other agent (sA); the two reactive behaviors, ”approach
cooperate location” (fC), ”approach defect location” (fD); and the two motors, one for the left
wheel (ml) and one for the right wheel (mr). Between the two layers, the inhibitory function
(i) regulates which reactive behaviors will be active depending on the action received from
the Adaptive layer, while the error monitoring function (pe) manages the mismatch between
the opponent’s predicted behavior and the actual observation in real-time.
The Reactive Layer is inspired by Valentino Braitenberg’s Vehicles [29] and
presents the intrinsic mechanic behaviors that are caused by a direct mapping
between the sensors and the motors of the agent. The main one, ”orienting to-
wards rewards”, is based on a cross excitatory connection and a direct inhibitory
connection between the reward sensors and the two motors. This results in an
approaching behavior in which the agents will turn towards a reward location
increasingly faster the closer they detect it. Since the agents are equipped with
two sets of sensors specifically tuned for detecting each reward location, they
also have two instances of this reactive behavior, one for the ’cooperative’ and
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one for the ’individual’ reward (see Figure 1 green box).
The Adaptive Layer is in charge of prediction, learning, and decision-making.
Each of the Agent Models described in the next section instantiates a different
Adaptive layer. Its main role is to learn from previous experience and to decide
at the beginning of each round which action the agent will take. When playing
normal-form games, the Adaptive Layer receives as inputs the state of the en-
vironment, which corresponds with the outcome of the last round of the game,
and the reward obtained because of that final state. This information is used
to produce an action as the output. The states S can be either ’R’, ’S’, ’T’ or
’P’ (see Table 1), and determines what is the reward that the agent will obtain
based on the specific payoff matrix of the game being played. The actions A
are two: ”cooperate” or ”defect”.
Depending on the action that the Adaptive Layer selects, there is a top-down
selective inhibition that affects the reactive behaviors of the Reactive Layer.
If the action selected is ”cooperate”, the ”approach individual reward” reactive
behavior is inhibited, thus focusing the agent’s attention only on the cooperative
reward and on the other agent. Conversely, if the action selected is ”defect”,
the reactive behavior inhibited will be ”approach cooperative reward”. This
mechanism aims to mimic how biological systems execute top-down control over
a hierarchy of different control structures [30, 31, 32].
The error monitoring function works in real-time as a bottom-up mechanism
that signals an error function from the Reactive layer sensors to the Adaptive
layer decision-making module. The error signal is only triggered when the agent
detects an inconsistency between its initial prediction of the opponent’s action
and the real-time data obtained by its sensors. If a prediction error occurs, the
error monitoring function will update the current state of the agent and this
will make the decision-making module output a new action. Along with the
top-down inhibitory control, this module is inspired by evidence from cognitive
science about the role of bottom-up sensory stimuli in generating prediction
errors [30, 33, 34].
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2.3. Agent Models
2.3.1. Original Model
Figure 2: Representations of the Original model. Panel A shows a detailed representation of
the algorithm components, as implemented in the Adaptive layer of the original implemen-
tation of the CRL model [13]. Panel B shows a compressed representation showing only the
inputs and outputs of that same model.
The Original CRL model uses an Actor-Critic version of the Temporal-
Difference (TD) learning algorithm [35] for maximizing long-term reward (see
[13] for a detailed description of the implementation).
In brief, the TD-learning algorithm selects an action according to a given
policy P (a = at|s = st−1) . Once a round of play is finished, the reward r(st)
obtained by the agent will update the TD-error e signal, following: e(st) =
r(st) + γVΠ(st) − VΠ(st−1) where γ is a discount factor and Vpi(st) = γr(st) is
the Critic. Finally, the policy (or Actor) will be updated following Π(at, st−1) =
Π(at, st−1) + δe(st−1), where δ is a learning rate that is set to 0.15.
2.3.2. Rational Model
The Rational Model is a predictive model that represents an ideal perfectly-
rational and self-interested player provided that its predictions are correct. Its
function is to serve as a benchmark for the other predictive models since once it
learns to predict its opponent’s actions accurately, it will always respond auto-
matically with the best response to that predicted action. It is composed of two
main functions: a prediction module and a deterministic utility maximization
function (see Figure 3). The first module tries to predict the next action of the
opponent by using a TD-learning algorithm that uses the opponent’s previous
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Figure 3: Representation of the Rational Model. This model is composed of a predictive
module (RL) that learns to predict the opponent’s future action and a utility maximization
function (U) that computes the action that yields the highest reward based on the opponent’s
predicted action. At the end of each round, the RL module is updated based on its prediction
error.
state as an input. Once the prediction is made, the second module calculates
the action that will render the highest reward assuming that the opponent has
chosen the predicted action.
This predictive model uses the same TD-learning algorithm as the origi-
nal, but substitutes the explicit reward for an implicit reward that comes from
the error in predicting the other agent’s action. We call this reward ’implicit’
because is calculated internally and it is based on whether the action of the
opponent was accurately predicted or not. That way, an accurate prediction
will render a positive reward, while an incorrect one will receive a negative one.
The implicit reward signal is calculated by the function:
Ri =
1, if Aot = Aˆot− 1−1, otherwise (1)
2.3.3. Predictive Model
The Predictive model has two distinct RL modules: one that learns to predict
and one that chooses an action based on that prediction (see Figure 4). The
predictive RL algorithm is same as the one used by the Rational agent described
above, so it also learns from the implicit reward obtained by Equation 1. The
prediction generated at the beginning of each round by the predictive-RL is sent
as an input to the second RL algorithm. This one, in turn, uses the combined
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Figure 4: Representation of the Predictive Model. This model is composed of a predictive
module (RL) that learns to predict the opponent’s future action and a TD learning module
(RL) that uses that prediction along with the previous state to learn the optimal policy. At the
end of the round, the predictive-RL (green) is updated according to its error in the prediction.
information of the opponent’s predicted action and the state of the previous
round to learn the optimal action. For its update function, the second RL
algorithm uses the explicit reward obtained in that round of the game.
2.3.4. Other’s Model
Figure 5: Representation of the Other’s-Model. This model is composed by two TD learning
algorithms. The first one (left, blue) learns to predict the opponent’s future action while the
second (right, red) uses a that prediction to learn the optimal policy. The first algorithm is
updated with the opponent’s reward and the second with the agent’s own reward.
The Other’s Model is also composed by RL algorithms, one predictive and
one for learning the optimal policy (see Figure 5. Technically, the second RL
module is identical to the one used by the Predictive model: it integrates both
the previous state of the game and the opponent’s predicted action in order to
learn the optimal policy. However, it differs from the Predictive model in the
way its first module is designed. In this case, the predictive-RL algorithm is
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updated by the explicit reward that the opponent has obtained, in an attempt
to create an internal model of the other agent’s policy. At the functional level
is very similar to the Predictive model, but with an important difference: while
the Predictive model tries predict the opponent’s action by focusing on its overt
behavior, the Other’s Model does it trying to learn the internal policy of its
opponent.
2.3.5. Deterministic Agent Models
In order to test the correct functioning of the predictive capacities of the
ToM agents described above, we have developed a number of agents have a
fixed behavior or policy. The first two represent two behavioral phenotypes
observed in humans [25] while the third one is a classic benchmark of Game
Theory [36].
2.3.5.1. Greedy Agent Model. This model implements a simple behavioral strat-
egy of pure self-utility maximization: it always chooses the action the renders
the highest reward to itself, without taking into account the opponent’s action.
So for the games described in this work, it will always choose to ’defect’ with
the exception of the Stag-Hunt and the Harmony Game, where the cooperative
reward can give a higher reward than the temptation to defect (R > T ).
pig =
cooperate, if R > Tdefect, otherwise (2)
2.3.5.2. Cooperative / Nice Agent Model. As a deterministic counterpart of the
Greedy model, the Nice model executes an even simpler deterministic strategy:
it will always choose cooperation.
pin = P (a = cooperate|st) = 1 (3)
2.3.5.3. Tit-for-Tat Agent Model. This simple yet powerful strategy became
popular in the famous Axelrod’s tournament [37] where it won to all competing
algorithms and strategies in a contest based on the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
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We have introduced this opponent because we expect that this agent will give
problems to the predictive models. Tit-for-tat starts always by cooperating,
and from then on it always chooses the last action made by its opponent. Since
its capacity to switch actions does not depend on a specific policy, it cannot be
learned by just taking into account variables such as its previous state or its
reward. It can be described by the following equation, where aopponent is the
action made by the opponent at t− 1:
pig =
cooperate, if t = 0aopponent(t− 1), otherwise (4)
2.4. Experimental Setup
First, we perform four different experiments in which we test the four learn-
ing models described above (Original, Rational, Predictive, Other’s-Model) in
each of the five games described in section 2.1 (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hawk-Dove,
Stag-Hunt, Harmony game and Battle of the Exes) and against opponents of
different level of complexity (Greedy, Nice, Tit-for-tat and Original), resulting
in a 4x5x4 experimental setup.
This way, in experiment one, all models are tested against the Greedy agent;
in experiment two, against the Nice agent; in experiment three, against the Tit-
for-tat agent; and in experiment four, against the Original agent.
In all experiments, each model plays 50 times each of the five games, during
a total amount of 1000 rounds per iteration (i.e., 5 games, 50 dyads per game,
1000 rounds per dyad). On each iteration, every model starts learning from
scratch, with no previous training period.
After that, we perform a fifth experiment to study in a real-time spatial
version of the games, special cases in which the models encountered problems
in the previous setting. So, in this first four experiments, we use the discrete-
time version of the games, and for the fifth experiment, a real/continuous time
version of the tasks.
In the discrete-time version, both agents simultaneously choose an action at
the beginning of each round. Immediately after that, the outcome of the round
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is calculated and each agent receives a reward equal to the value stated in the
payoff matrix of the game.
In the continuous-time version, the two agents can choose to go to one of the
two equally distant locations that represent the two actions of a 2-action matrix-
form game (see Figure 6-B). In this version, agents also choose an action at the
beginning of the round, but then they have to navigate towards the selected
location until one of them reaches its destination. The real-time dimension of
this implementation allows the possibility of changing the action during the
course of the round as well as to receive feedback in real-time. Each round of
the game begins with both agents in their initial positions, as shown in Figure
6-B. When the agents reach a reward location, the round ends, the rewards
are distributed accordingly to the payoff matrix and the game restarts with the
agents back in their starting positions.
Figure 6: A) A top-down visualization of the agents used in the continuous version of the
games. The green circles represent the location-specific sensors, and the red circles the agent-
specific ones. The green lines that connect the location sensors with the wheels represent
the Braitenberg-like excitatory and inhibitory connections. B) Image of initial conditions
in the continuous/real-time spatial version of the tasks. The blue circles are the two agents
facing each other (representing two ePuck robots viewed from the top). The big green circle
represents the ’cooperate’ reward location; the small green circle, the ’defect’ reward. The
white circles around each reward spot mark the threshold of the detection area.
The agents of the continuous version are embodied in virtual ePuck robots
(see 6-A. They are equipped with two motors (for the left and right wheels)
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and three pairs of proximity sensors; one pair is specialized in detecting the
other agent, and the other two in detecting the two distinct reward locations
(’cooperate’ or ’defect’).
3. Results
In order to study the performance of the four agents (Original, Rational,
Predictive and Other’s-Model), we focus on three aspects of the interaction:
Efficacy, Prediction Accuracy, and Stability.
Efficacy tells us how competent the models were in obtaining rewards on
average and in relation to each other. It’s computed by calculating the mean
score per game for each model. Stability measures how predictable the behavior
was or, equivalently, whether the models converged to a common strategy or
alternated between non-deterministic states. In other words, stability quanti-
fies how predictable are the outcomes of the following rounds based on previous
results by using the information-theoretic measure of surprisal (also known as
self-information), which can be defined as the negative logarithm of the proba-
bility of an event [38]. By computing the average surprisal value of a model over
time, we can visually observe how much did it take for a model to converge to a
stable strategy and for how long it was able to maintain it. Finally, Prediction
Accuracy give us a better understanding of how well the predictive models were
able to actually predict their opponent’s behavior. It’s measured by the average
accumulated prediction error of each predictive model in each game.
3.1. Experiment 1: Against a deterministic-greedy agent
The results of this experiment show that on average all models were equally
effective since they obtained a similar amount of rewards (see Figure 7). The
Rational model only achieves a slightly better performance than the rest in the
Stag-hunt and the Harmony game, so this is a sign that the rest of the models
were performing almost optimally. Of course, if we pay attention to the overall
score obtained among the five games, we can observe a significant difference
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Figure 7: Main results of the four behavioral models (Original, Rational, Predictive and
Other’s) against a Greedy agent.
between the performance obtained by all models in the Harmony game and the
Hawk-dove when compared to the other three games. This salient difference
is not due to a malfunctioning of the predictive models, as we can see by the
results in Stability and Prediction Accuracy. It is caused by the constraints
imposed by the Greedy opponent strategy in those games were T > R, since
are the ones in which it always select to ’defect’. We see that all models learn
to predict or to adapt their strategy to this opponent. In terms of surprisal, we
can observe how Rational Agents outperforms all the other models. This result
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is not surprising given the simplicity of the opponent’s strategy. Against these
simple predictable agents, we consider the Rational agent a reference point of
optimal performance, against which the other models can be compared. In this
line, a more significant result is that overall, both Predictive and Other’s-Model
converge to a stable state faster than the original model, who lacks the ability to
predict the opponent’s action. In terms of Prediction Accuracy, no significant
difference is observed.
3.2. Experiment 2: Against a deterministic-nice agent
Figure 8: Main results of the four behavioral models (Original, Rational, Predictive and
Other’s) against a Nice agent. The legend in the center applies to the left and middle columns.
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In this experiment, the overall efficacy of all models has increased signifi-
cantly compared to that of the previous experiment (see Figure 8). The ex-
planation was again that all models were able to successfully learn the optimal
policy against a simple deterministic strategy such as the one exhibited by the
Nice agent. But in this case, the best response strategy against a Nice agent
is the one that renders the highest possible benefit in all games, as opposed to
the best response strategy against the Greedy model, that in many occasions
was sub-optimal. In terms of surprisal, we see again how the Predictive and
the Other’s-Model perform slightly better than the Original. This time the dif-
ference is smaller, but since predicting the opponent’s behavior, in this case, is
almost trivial, we don’t find this result unexpected. Again we can also observe
how the Original, the Predictive and the Other’s-Model differ from optimal by
comparing their convergence rate with that of the Rational agent.
3.3. Experiment 3: Against a Tit-for-tat agent
The results of the models against the Tit-for-tat agent show a significant
amount of variability in terms of efficacy (see Figure 9). The most remarkable
result in this aspect is the superior efficacy of the non-predictive Original model
in the Battle of the Exes. This model is able to beat the more complex predictive
models in this case precisely because the predictive models are having problems
to accurately predict the TFT agent. This accumulated error in prediction, in
turn, drives their behavior toward a more unstable regime than the one achieved
by the Original model. Moreover, given that this model has a more reduced
state-space than the Predictive models and it only ’cares’ about the previous
state of the game, it capitalizes better than the rest on the anti-coordination
structure of the Battle of the Exes.
In terms of suprisal, predictive models perform better than the Original in
the Prisoners Dilemma and in the Harmony game, but this result is reversed
in the Stag-Hunt and the Hawk-Dove and the Battle of the Exes, where the
Original reaches lower levels of surprisal. We can see how in the cases that the
game has one pure Nash equilibrium (the Prisoner’s dilemma and the Harmony
19
Figure 9: Main results of the four behavioral models (Original, Rational, Predictive and
Other’s) against a TFT agent.
game), the predictive models perform as well in terms of surprisal as against the
simpler deterministic agents studied before. However, in games with a wider
variety of equilibria such as the Stag-hunt or the Hawk-dove, predictive models
have overall more difficulties to fall into a stable state with the TFT opponent
Finally, the most salient feature regarding the resutls of Prediction accuracy
are the elevated accumulation of errors of the Rational model in the Stag-Hunt
and the Battle of the Exes, that almost reach 50%. These results may seem
counter-intuitive, but actually, they highlight one of the weak points of the
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predictive models and the strength of such a simple strategy. As stated in the
model’s description, the TFT agent selects its action based on the last action
performed by its opponent, so attempting to predict a policy of such agent can
become impossible for a predictive agent unless the dyad falls into an equilibrium
state very soon or if the predictive agent was able to integrate it’s own action
into its prediction algorithm.
3.4. Experiment 4: Against the Original agent
Figure 10: Mean results of the four behavioral models (Original, Rational, Predictive and
Other’s) against the Original agent.
In this experiment, we also observe a similar performance of the models in
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terms of their efficacy to obtain rewards, with the exception of the Battle of the
Exes, where the Predictive an Other’s-Model achieve the best results (see Figure
10. Remarkably, the Rational model is achieving a lower score than the rest.
This is due to the fact that this model has fallen in a pure-dominance equilibrium
with the Original model, where the best response for him is to perform the low-
rewarding action. Again, in this case, the Original model capitalizes in the
fact that is solely driven by its own self-utility maximization function, so it
got the initiative to go to the higher-rewarding action faster than the Rational
model. This, on the other hand, is predicting accurately and responding in the
best optimal way to that accurate prediction. But in this case, this behavioral
strategy makes it fall victim to the pure-dominance equilibrium enforced by its
opponent.
Regarding stability, the results show that overall the Predictive and the
Other’s-Model converge faster than the Original towards an equilibrium. In
all cases, we can observe that these two predictive models fall in between the
’optimal’ level of convergence of the Rational model and the more unstable level
of the Original non-predictive model. The results of the Prediction accuracy
show the worse overall performance of the four experiments studied so far. This,
however, was an expected outcome since the predictive agents were facing a
learning non-deterministic agent which is objectively more difficult to predict.
3.5. Experiment 5: Continuous-Time Dyads
Figure 11: Results of a game played in the continuous/real-time version of the game compared
to the same game played in discrete-time.
As an additional control experiment, here we test whether specific instances
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in experiment 3 above, where the Rational agent shows huge prediction errors
against the TFT agent, are purely a result of the discrete-time nature of ballistic
games, or similar errors against the TFT agent also repeat under continuous-
time interactions involving real-time feedback. As shown in Figure 11, this issue
of prediction errors is in fact solved under real-time conditions. This is because
the Rational agent is now able to change its chosen course of action in real-time
before the round ends. This significantly reduces the prediction error of the
rational agent against the TFT agent and enables the former to choose a better
strategy, which consequently, drives the dyad to a stable equilibrium.
4. Discussion
This work demonstrates a novel control-based cognitive approach to au-
tonomous multi-agent learning models, which combines adaptive feedback con-
trol with reinforcement learning. Based on a layered-control architecture, we
have designed and implemented agent models characterized by seven different
behavioral phenotypes. This includes both, deterministic agents as well as prob-
abilistic learning agents. The former includes cooperative, greedy and tit-for-tat
agents, whereas, the latter includes a reinforcement learning, rational, predic-
tive and other’s-model agents. We tested these agent models in dyadic games
against each other across five different game theory settings (Harmony game,
Stag-Hunt, Hawk-Dove, Prisoner’s Dilemma and Battle of the Exes). From
human behavioral experiments, it is known that the scope of these games suf-
ficiently encompasses behavioral phenotypes in human social decision-making
[23, 25]. Our proposed agent models were designed and implemented with a
view to simulating and understanding how cognitive agents learn and make de-
cisions when interacting with other agents in social scenarios (in the context of
the game-theoretic tasks stated above).
Additionally, we also implemented our agent models as embodied ePuck
robots. We tested these simulated robots within a spatial continuous version of
the game involving real-time feedback. We showed that under fully embodied
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and situated conditions, limitations encountered by agents in ballistic scenarios
(such as lack of convergence to an optimal solution) can overcome. Our simu-
lated robots are Braitenberg Vehicles equipped with sensors and fully embodied
controllers (which are the proposed control-based learning modules). These
agents are situated in the sense that they only have partial observability of the
environment and other agents depending on their location and sensors during
rounds.
We found that pure reinforcement learning was inadequate in many tasks (as
shown in performance metrics). On the other hand, agent models that predict
actions or policies of opposing agents showed faster convergence to equilibria
and increased performance. Interestingly, the rational agent (which knows what
is the best action to take in each game and situation if the other’s action is
foreseen) outperforms others in many games. Our results show that agents
using pure reinforcement-learning strategies are not optimal in most of the tested
games. Additionally, upon examining human data obtained in the Battle of the
Exes game by [23], we found (not shown in the results) that surprisal profiles
of human players matched closest to our predictive and other’s-model agents,
rather than the rational or pure RL agents.
Of particular significance is the result that our predictive and other’s-model
agents correctly learn to predict actions and policies respectively of the opposing
agent across all games. This shows how autonomous, embodied and situated
multi-agent systems can be equipped with simple theory of mind capabilities (in
the context of the specified tasks). For future work, it might be interesting to
equip our agents with meta-learning models, so that they may be able to choose
which behavioral phenotype to enact in a given social scenario and flexibly
switch in changing environments.
Even though the different behavioral strategies modeled in this study consist
some of the simplest building blocks of human behavior, it is by no means a
complete list. Also, typical human behavior is not rigidly tied to a given model,
but rather can flexibly shift between behavioral strategies. Model flexibility is
definitely an important consideration for a ToM. Another issue that is relevant
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for many real-world tasks is the cost or penalty of being engaged too often in less
desirable outcomes such as ties or low rewards. In a sense, this could serve as
an incentive to improve performance in complex tasks and should be taken into
account in a ToM. Yet another typical human feature is trust. Humans tend to
form social conventions by agreeing on simple rules or deals and forming a trust
relation. At the moment, our models currently lack this ability to form teams
that agree on collective goals and work cooperatively to achieve success.
Finally, our control-based reinforcement learning architecture provides an
interesting possibility to implement complex social behaviors on multi-agent
robotic platforms, such as humanoid robots [39] or other socially intelligent ar-
tificial systems. Another scientific domain that may benefit from the type of
agent models described in this paper, is evolutionary dynamics; in particular,
the evolution of cognitive and intelligent agents. Social interactions involving
cooperation and competition are known to play a key role in many evolution-
ary accounts of biological life and consciousness [40], [41]. Lastly, autonomous
multi-agent models, of the type described above, with ToM capabilities, provide
useful tools for modeling the dynamics of global socio-political and cultural
phenomena.
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